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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
only person to twice be elected president of the Montana State
University Alumni Association. He is married to the former
Mildred Lore of Billings, also an MSU graduate.
COLLATERAL DEFENSES TO NEGOTflABLE
INSTRUMENTS
This paper has been prepared in an effort to clarify the law
relating to the right to set off' a claim arising out of a collateral
transaction in an action on a negotiable instrument by one who
is not a holder in due course.
An examination of this problem involves an analysis of some
fundamental propositions applicable to the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law. This act shall hereafter be referred to as the
N I L.
As to the construction of the N I L, Brannan' quotes Mr.
Eaton' as expressing the weight of authority and the better view.
The following extract is taken from Mr. Eaton's article:
"... It ought to be interpreted in such a way as to
give effect to the beneficient design of the Legislature in
passing an Act for the promotion of harmony upon an
important branch of the law. Simplicity and clearness
are ends especially to be sought. The language of the act
is to be construed with reference to the object to be at-
tained. Its words are to be given their natural and com-
mon meaning, and the prevailing principles of statutory
interpretation are to be employed. Care should be taken
to adhere as closely as possible to the obvious meaning of
the act, without resort to that which had theretofore
been the law of any particular commonwealth, unless
necessary to dissolve obscurity or doubt, especially in in-
stances where there was a difference in the law of the
different states.'
'In Teeters v. City Nat. Bank of Auburn (1938) 214 Ind. 498, 14 N.E.
(2d) 1004, 118 A.L.R. 383, set-off was defined as "the right which exists
between two persons, each of whom under an independent contract, ex-
press or implied, owes an ascertained amount to the other, to set off
their mutual debts by way or deduction so that, in an action brought for
the larger debt, the residue only after such deduction may be recovered."
It must be remembered that the right of set-off is statutory, and that
the statutes and the constructions thereof vary as to the time when the
claims must have matured and as to the parties against whom the set-
off is available. See 2 WILLIsToN ON CoNTRAcTs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 432,
p. 1245.
'BEuTmL, BPANNAN's NmoIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (6th ed. 1938) p. 100.
President of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws during the early years of it's history.
'Eaton, Deci8ions on Negotiable Instrument8, 14 HARv. L. Rsv. 88, 93
(1913).
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An examination of the N I L as an entity will indicate that
Article IV, entitled "Rights of the Holder," is the Article which
contains the provisions pertinent to this discussion. Section 52
establishes the qualifications for a holder in due course. Section
57 defines the rights of a holder in due course. Section 58, en-
titled "When Subject to Original Defenses," defines the rights
of one not a holder in due course, as follows:
"In the hands of any holder other than a holder in
due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the
same defenses as if it were non-negotiable . . . "
The language of these sections, taken literally, makes it very
clear that unless a holder meets the requirements set up for a
holder in due course, Section 58 will define his rights. In other
words, a holder is either black or he is white, and there is no
gray.
It should also be noted that this Section dues not provide
that the instrument loses it's negotiable character if it is not in
the hands of a holder in due course. The instrument remains
negotiable, but this holder gets no benefit from that fact. As we
shall see later, there is some confusion on this point.
One very fundamental proposition cannot be overlooked in
construing Section 58. The overwhelming weight of authority
supports the proposition that the N I L is not applicable to non-
negotiable instruments." If this principle is kept in mind, an ex-
amination of Section 58 can lead to only one conclusion; that if
an instrument is to be subject to the same defenses as if it were
non-negotiable, then the N I L will not govern those defenses.
If the N I L has an application to non-negotiable instruments,
then the law pertaining to those instruments must be the same
law that existed in each jurisdiction prior to the enactment of
the N I L. From this, it is a necessary conclusion that the law
of each jurisdiction will determine the 'defenses' to which a hold-
er not in due course of a negotiable instrument is subject.
That this conclusion was the one intended by the drafters of
the N I L is indicated by the Commissioner's Note to Section 58:
" (a) It is not deemed expedient to make provi-
sions as to what equities the transferee will be subject
to; for the matter may be affected by the statutes relat-
ing to set-off and counter-claim. On the question wheth-
'The remaining portion of this section is not pertinent here. It provides:
"But a holder who derives his title through a holder in due course, and
who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the in-
strument, has all the rights of such former holder in respect to all par-
ties prior to the latter."65 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (1943) § 190, p. 700.
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er only such equities may be asserted as attach to the
bill or whether equities arising out of collateral matters
may also be asserted, the decisions are conflicting. In
an act designed to be uniform in the various states, no
more can be done than fix the rights of holders in due
course. '"
The conclusion from this must be that the rights of a holder
not in due course are to be determined by treating the instru-
ment as though it were non-negotiable, thus subjecting it to the
law applicable to non-negotiable instruments in the particular
jurisdiction.
An example of the effect of a proper application of Section
58 can be found in Litcher v. North City Trust Co.8 Prior to the
adoption of the N I L, Pennsylvania law apparently had allowed
a set-off to be interposed against a holder of a non-negotiable
instrument, but had not allowed a set-off to be interposed against
a holder of a negotiable instrument, regardless of whether or not
he was a holder in due course. In this case, where a set-off was
sought to be set up against a holder not in due course of a nego-
tiable instrument, the Court considered Section 58, and decided
that this section made it imperative to allow a set-off against this
holder, since this was the rule applicable to non-negotiable instru-
ments, and the section specifically provided that the rule ap-
plicable to non-negotiable instruments was to be applied to one
who was not a holder in due course.
The result of the Litcher case is in accord with the intent
of the section, for it appears that this section was designed to
eliminate any confusion which might arise from the fact that an
instrument might be given special treatment if it was negotiable,
even though it were not in the hands of a holder in due course.
But, an examination of the cases that have construed Section
58 indicates that a considerable confusion exists as to it's true
import, due at least in part to a tendency to extract statements
from context.
Even so eminent an authority as Professor Chafee appar-
ently has overlooked the full import of the N I L and, especially,
of Section 58. Writing on the rights of the holder of overdue
paper," he suggests that this holder is entitled to more protection
than he presently receives. While Chafee only considers the
N I L in passing, his language is misleading, and, perhaps, even
'BEUTL, op. Cit., p. 33.
1(1933) 111 Pa. Super. 1, 169 A. 409.
0Chafee, Righta in Overdue Paper, 31 HAv. L. REv. 1104, (1917).
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incorrect. After saying that the Act apparently leaves the prob-
lem untouched, which is, in a limited sense, correct, he says:
"... By Section 57 a holder in due course holds the in-
strument 'free from any defect of title of prior parties.'
This may imply that a purchaser after maturity, not
being a holder in due course, is subject to such defects,
but such an implication is not necessary. The law ought
not to be crystalized by vague inferences, especially as
the section which provides for persons who are not hold-
ers in due course subjects them only to 'defenses' and
does not touch claims to ownership.' '
Since, by Section 52, a transferree after maturity can not be
a holder in due course, there is more than a 'vague inference'
expresed in Section 58, which provides that in the hands of any
holder other than a holder in due course, the instrument shall be
subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. It is
true, as has been suggested, that in some jurisdictions the law
prior to the N I L gave a preferred position to a negotiable note
even in the hands of a holder not in due course. But, the clear
language of the N I L, as was shown in the Litcher case, has
changed this rule, thus removing some of the uncertainty that
existed under the prior rule.
The Professor may present a valid argument for changing
Section 52 so that a transferree of an overdue instrument may
be a holder in due course, but as the law now stand the trans-
ferree should be in the same position as the transferree of a non-
negotiable note under similar circumstances.
The leading American case on the question of whether a set-
off would be available against a negotiable instrument in the
hands of a holder not in due course would seem to be Chandler v.
Drew." This case, decided long before the N I L was even en-
visioned, established the proposition that, while a holder not in
due course took subject to equities and defenses, a set-off was not
a defense, strictly speaking, and would not be allowed as against
a holder not in due course.
This rule seems to have been uniformly followed up to the
time of the N I L, although it was modified to some degree by
statutes.
There have been many cases decided on the question of set-
off since the adoption of the N I L and it would be beyond the
scope of this paper to analyze all of them. It should be sufficient
to discuss a few of them in order to demonstrate some of the more
'id0., p. 1140.
"(1834) 6 N.H. 469, 26 Am. Dec. 704.
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typical approaches taken by the courts and the results reached by
these approaches.
An exhaustive opinion on this question appears in Stegal v.
Union Bank & Federal Trust Co.' The facts in that case, inso-
far as they are pertinent here, are very similar to those in the
Litcher case.' The defendant, in an action on a negotiable instru-
ment by one who was not a holder in due course, sought to set-off
certain deposits which he had in the payee bank at the time it
became insolvent. The Virginia statute allowed a set-off against
a non-negotiable note, but in spite of this fact, the Court held
that the set-off would not be allowed here.
Although the reasoning of the Court is not entirely clear,
it would appear to be essentially as follows: By the law mer-
chant, a set-off is not a defense, and the N I L is a codification
of the law merchant. Therefore, a set-off is not a defense as the
term is used in Section 58 of the N I L. If the term 'defenses'
were construed to include set-off, this would change the law in
those jurisdictions which, prior to the N I L, had not allowed a
set-off as a defense in a suit on a negotiable instrument that was
not in the hands of a holder in due course. The final conclusion
is that set-off is not included in 'defenses' as that term is used
in Section 58, but that this does not operate to repeal any statutes
accord with the intent and logical construction of the N I L.
Several criticisms may be made of this approach. In the
first place, it could be suggested that the N I L is not, strictly
speaking, a codification of the law merchant. It is true that the
Act was based on the law merchant to a great degree, but this
does not mean that it did not make substantial changes in the law
merchant. A much more accurate statement is that the N I L is
a codification of the prior law relating to negotiable instruments."
In the next place, it will be noted that there is an assumption in
the reasoning of the case that the'term 'defenses' was to be con-
strued so that the same defenses would be allowed in every juris-
diction enacting the N I L. If the N I L is not applicable to non-
negotiable instruments, and Section 58 provides that an instru-
ment is to be treated "as if it were non-negotiable," then it would
seem clear that the 'defenses' will vary in each jurisdiction as the
law applicable to non-negotiable instruments varies.
For these reasons, it is submitted that the Stegal case is
wrong, and that the result reached by the Litcher case is more in
accord with the intent and logical construction of the N I L.
'(1934) 163 Va. 417, 176 S.E. 438, 95 A.L.R. 582.
ls8upra, note 9.
"Umpra, note 6, p. 690 cites cases.
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The statement found in Worden v. Gillett' that Section 58
"does not enlarge the scope of the statute of set-off" must not
be taken at it's face value. As has been suggested, in some juris-
dictions Section 58 does enlarge the scope of the statute of set-off,
for it makes a set-off available in a situation where it had not
been available before. Where, as in Florida, the statutes of set-
off apparently did not allow a set-off against a non-negotiable
instrument in the hands of an assignee or transferree, the state-
ment is correct, but it would not be correct in all jurisdictions.
An example of the result to be reached by a blind following
of a statement of this kind is the dictum in the South Dakota case
of Harris v. Esterbrook.' There, a transferree without indorse-
ment was suing on a negotiable promissory note. The maker
sought to set-off deposits in the payee bank, which had become
insolvent. The Court finally decided that if a right of set-off
had existed it had been lost by a subsequent withdrawal of the
deposits, but, in reaching it's conclusion, the Court discussed
the matter of set-off in this situation.
The Court admitted that the holder was not a holder in due
course and that he took subject to equities and defenses. It cited
a statute which would apparently allow a set-off against a non-
negotiable instrument in the hands of an assignee. However, cit-
ing the early case of Chandler v. Drew," the Court said that a
set-off was not a defense within the meaning of the term 'equities
and defenses.' The Court quoted from Worden v. Gillett' and,
referring to Section 58, said that the statutes were the same.
As has been suggested, the statement from Worden v. Gillett
was correct in Florida, but it was not correct in South Dakota.
The Court should have applied the rule expressed in the Litcher
case," which changes the older rule of Chandler v. Drew."
Because the language used by the courts is so ambiguous
and misleading, it is doubtful that any rule can be said to express
a majority view. The situation is further complicated by the fact
that a court adopting the construction suggested by this paper
may just assume that a holder not in due course takes subject to
a set-off without any discussion. For instance, the Washington
Court has apparently assumed that a set-off is available in that
jurisdiction without even mentioning Section 58.'
(1923) 275 F. 654, 656.
"(1929) 55 S.D. 543, 226 N.W. 753, 70 A.L.R. 241.17supra, note 11.
"supra, note 15.
2supra, note 8.2Supra, note 11.
"Hanson v. Roesch (1918) 104 Wash. 257, 176 P. 349.
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It is clear that the result reached in the Stegal case and in
Harris v. Esterbrook is contradictory to the language of the Sec-
tion, if the Section is construed according to the ordinary mean-
ing of it's words, and that the true import of Section 58 is that
a negotiable note in the hands of a holder not in due course shall
be subject to the same defenses as is a non-negotiable note in the
particular jurisdiction. Thus, whether a set-off is allowed will
depend on the law of the jurisdiction,' and the matter is not con-
trolled by the N I L except as suggested above.
The precise problem of whether a set-off is to be allowed
against a negotiable instrument not in the hands of a holder in
due course has never come before the Montana Court, but it is
likely that the Court will allow the set-off when the question does
come before it.
In order to understand the Montana position, it might be
well to consider the status of the substantive law of set-off before
examining the effect of the N I L.
There is a definite inconsistency in the language used in the
Montana statutes. Section 58-303" provides that the assignee of
a non-negotiable instrument shall be "subject to all equities and
defenses existing in favor of the maker at the time of the indorse-
ment." Section 93-2802" provides that an action by an assignee
of a thing in action shall be:
"... without prejudice to any set-off or other defense
existing at the time of, or before, notice of the assign-
ment, but this section does not apply to a negotiable
promissory note or bill of exchange, transferred in good
faith and upon good consideration before maturity. "'s
"Nearly all states allow a set-off against a non-negotiable contract that
has been assigned, but since the matter is statutory, the statutes and the
constructions thereof vary greatly from state to state. The principal
variaion among the states is on the time element, that Is, when the
claims must have matured in relation to each other and to the assign-
ment. In 2 WTITSTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 432, p. 1246, it
is said that "the only questions should be, (1) did the claim against the
assignor exist whether matured or not, before notice of the assignment,
and (2) were both claims matured when the set-off was asserted." This
is the rule adopted by the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS,
§ 167. There is a definite conflict among the states as to whether the
claim sought to be used as a set-off must have existed before the trans-
fer, or whether it need only have existed before notice of the transfer,
but the better view would seem to be the one adopted by Professor
Williston and by the Restatement. For a full discussion of the merits
of this view, see Williston, supra, § 432.
"R.C.M. 1947.
"' td2The latter portion of this section states an exception to the operation of
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Section 93-2802 immediately follows the section8 which pro-
vides for suits by the real party in interest, and was enacted at
the same time as that section. In view of this, it is not surprising
to find the Court holding that Section 93-2802 is merely a pro-
cedural statute, and that Section 58-303 governs the substantive
law applicable to non-negotiable instruments. This is the posi-
tion of the Court in Stadler v. First Nat. Bank,' where the Court
ruled that a set-off, to be allowed, must have existed as a present
right at the time of the assignment. The Court relied in part on
Section 93-3409 which contains language that supports the idea
that the nature of a set-off is such that the demands must have
existed at the same time. In reaching it's conclusion, the Court
cited authority from other jurisdictions to the effect that, while
notice is required before other defenses will be cut off, the set-
off must have existed as a present right at the time of the as-
signment.
In the latter case of Cornish v. Woolverton,"8 the Court ap-
parently was misled by this reference to the law of other juris-
dictions, for it cited the Stadler case as laying down the rule that
notice was required to cut off the possibility of a defense arising
out of subsequent .dealings between the debtor and the assignor.
In the Cornish case, the Court refused to allow a defense of pay-
ment, because notice of the assignment had been given before the
payment was made.
Following the language of the Cornish case, the Court held,
the rule laid out in the section. The precise meaning of the term "trans-
ferred" as it Is used here is not clear. It could be argued that the lan-
guage used here was merely intended to exclude holders in due course
from the rule. If this Idea were adopted, the "transfer" would have to
be by indorsement. However, it is equally arguable that no indorse-
ment is needed to "transfer" an instrument and that a "transferee"
without Indorsement of a negotiable instrument could come within this
exception, even though he would not be a holder in due course. This
problem was discussed but not decided in Harris v. Esterbrook, 8upra,
note 16. No direct authority on this point has been found.
While it is impossible to give a decisive answer to this problem, it
should be noted that If Section 58 Is given the effect favored by this
comment, the problem will disappear. If the exception merely applies
to holders in due course, there is no problem, for they take free of
equities and defenses under the N I L. If the exception is construed to
include a transferee without indorsement, then Section 58 would operate
to repeal it by implication for a transferee of a negotiable instrument
without indorsement is not a holder in due course, and he would take
subject to the same defenses as if the instrument were non-negotiable.
The law applicable to non-negotiable instruments is set out in the first
portion of the section, so the latter portion could have no effect.2 R.C.M. 1947 § 93-2801.
"(1899) 22 Mont. 190, 56 P. 111.
"(1905) 32 Mont. 456, 81 P. 4.
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in Erlandson v. Erskine," that payment made after the assign-
ment, but before notice thereof, was a good defense. In holding
this way, the Court is requiring notice before some defenses are
cut off. Since the better view would seem to be that notice should
be required before any defense is cut off, including set-off,' it is
submitted that the Court should modify the rule of the Stadler
case, and allow a set-off if it existed before notice of the assign-
ment.'
Except as to the question of the time at which the claim
must exist, it is clear that a set-off is available against the holder
of a non-negotiable note in Montana.
There remains the question of whether or not a holder of a
negotiable instrument who is not a holder in due course will be
subject to a set-off. The fact that the N I L deals only with
negotiable instruments has been recognized and the Court has
said:
"The Negotiable Instruments Act deals with nego-
tiable instruments only so long as they are in the hands
of holders in due course. If in other hands, they are
subject to the same defenses as if non-negotiable.'
This language still leaves room for a decision that a set-off
is not a defense as that term is used here, but it should be pointed
out that Montana has never ruled that a set-off is not a defense,
nor has it ruled that a set-off is not available as against a holder
not in due course of a negotiable instrument. Thus, some of the
barriers that have misled courts in other jurisdictions are not
before the Montana Court.
It should also be noted that Section 93-2802, which has been
given at least some substantive effect, speaks of "set-off or other
defense," which could be construed as legislative recognition of
the fact that a set-off is a defense.
There is also the fact that the Court has spoken of negotiable
instruments as losing their "negotiable character" when they are
transferred to holders not in due course.' If this language were
followed literally, it would be at least some authority for holding
that an instrument not in the hands of a holder in due course
2(1926) 76 Mont. 537, 248 P. 209.
supra, note 22.
aUnder statutes similar to those of Montana, California has held that an
assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to any set-off or other de-
fense existing at or before notice to the obligor of the assignment. See
McCabe v. Grey (1862) 20 Cal. 509; McKenney v. Ellsworth (1913) 165
Cal. 326, 132 P. 75.
OAnderson v. Border (1925) 75 Mont. 516, 525, 244 P. 494.
"First Nat. Bank v. Grow (1920) 57 Mont. 376, 188 P. 907.
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should be treated as if it were non-negotiable. It must be remem-
bered, however, that this language is not technically correct. The
instrument is still negotiable, but the holder not in due course is
precluded from taking advantage of the negotiability of the in-
strument.
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing material
must be that the correct rule under the N I L and the Montana
statutes is that a holder not in due course of a negotiable instru-
ment is subject to a set-off arising from a collateral transaction,
and that this is likely to be the rule that Montana will adopt.
DEAN JELLISON.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE MONTANA
CONSTITUTION?
A familiar constitutional doctrine declares that a state con-
*stitution is not a grant of, but a limitation upon, power. In-
herent in this statement is the contrast that authority for Fed-
eral activity must exist within the scope of delegated power-
either enumerated or implied in the Federal Constitution-where-
as authority for state activity exists unless the activity be for-
bidden, expressly Or impliedly, by the state constitution, or the
superior Federal Constitution. State authority otherwise is plen-
ary.
As a working principle the majority of states have -found it
unnecessary to qualify the doctrine further than to assert that
the constitution is an instrument of limitation upon legislative
authority.1 Where more fully refined the doctrine has been taken
to mean either:
(1) the constitution is a limitation upon legislative power
but a delegation of judicial and executive power, or
(2) the constitution is a limitation upon each of the de-
partments of government.!
Relying on three cases the editors of CoRPuS JuRIs SECUN-
DUM present Montana as being the only state holding the latter
view." The purpose of this comment is to question our unique
stand and by consideration of the Governor's office under the
Constitution suggest what may be a less defeasible position.
From 1895 to 1916 the Montana Supreme Court had need in
'C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 70, p. 134, gives Connecticut as holding
that their legislature acts under delegated power.2C.J.S. Constitutional Law, 70, footnote 88.
aMont.-State ex rel. DuFresne v. Leslie, 50 P.2d 959, 100 Mont. 449, 101
A.L.R. 1329-Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission,
293 P. 294, 88 Mont. 180-Hilger v. Moore, 182 P. 477, 56 Mont. 146.
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